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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 920148-CA 
v. s 
NICHOLAS GARCIA RAMIREZ, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant.s 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction of aggravated assault, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1990), entered as a 
class A misdemeanor pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 (Supp. 
1992). This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(f) (1992). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The only issue on appeal is: 
Did the trial court commit reversible error in 
concluding that the victim's identification of defendant was 
reliable and, therefore, admissible? 
In reviewing a trial court's determination of the 
constitutional admissibility of eyewitness identification, the 
court's factual findings are reversed only if clearly erroneous; 
its legal conclusion is reviewed for correctness. State v. 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 782 (Utah 1991); State v. Adams, 830 P.2d 
310, 311 (Utah App. 1992). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The text of any constitutional provision, statute or 
rule relevant to a determination of this case is contained in the 
body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with attempted second degree 
murder, a second degree* felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-5-203 and § 76-4-102 (1990), and aggravated robbery, a first 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1990) 
(R. 6-7). Realizing that State v. Bell, 785 P.2d 390, 393 (Utah 
1989) precluded the charging of attempted felony-murder, the 
State amended the homicide count to aggravated assault, a third 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1990) 
(R. 4, 8-9, 42-46). 
Defendant moved to suppress the victim's eyewitness 
identification (R. 53-61). After a two-day evidentiary hearing, 
the motion was denied (R. 70, 72, 78, 326-333). Defendant 
petitioned the Utah Supreme Court for interlocutory review; the 
petition was denied (R. 80, 83-89). 
On February 14, 1992, defendant entered a conditional 
no contest plea to aggravated assault, reserving his right to 
appeal the denial of the motion to suppress (R. 106, 121-25). 
The conviction was entered as a class A misdemeanor and the 
robbery count was dismissed. Defendant was given credit for time 
served and released from custody the same day (R. 107, 121-26). 
Defendant timely filed a notice of appeal (R. 109-10). 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Shortly before noon on December 1, 1990, three 
individuals assaulted Leslie Norwood (R. 199, 255). One hit Mr, 
Norwood on the head; another stabbed him five times with a small 
knife (R. 199, 205, 209, 240). At the time, Mr. Norwood was 
drunk (R. 173, 181). 
Mr. Norwood told the police that a "male mexican" named 
"Chico" had stabbed him; he said they had met the night before at 
a transient camp (R. 134-35, 137, 201-03, 253-55, 263). Mr. 
Norwood was shown a photo-spread but he did not identify anyone 
(R. 138-39). Defendant's picture was not in the photo-spread (R. 
151, 163). 
Defendant was arrested on December 20, 1990 (R. 139). 
In late January, 1991, the police drove Mr. Norwood to the 
preliminary hearing courtroom. During the drive, a detective 
told Mr. Norwood, "[W]e have arrested the person who has stabbed 
you" (R. 140-42, 162, 237). In the courtroom, defendant was the 
only male in handcuffs and jail garb (R. 238-39). When Mr. 
Norwood saw him, he immediately told his companion that defendant 
was the person who stabbed him (R. 209-10). 
In late March, 1991, Mr. Norwood identified defendant 
in a lineup (R. 142-43). 
Additional facts concerning the eyewitness 
identification will be discussed in the argument portion of this 
brief as relevant to the specific findings of the trial court. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Due process requires a trial court to determine the 
reliability of an eyewitness identification prior to its 
admission at trial. The trial court must examine the 
circumstances surrounding the criminal episode and the subsequent 
identification and then determine if, under the totality of these 
circumstances, the identification is reliable. The trial court's 
conclusion of admissibility is independent of the jury's ultimate 
determination of the weight to accord the identification. 
On appeal, the trial court's factual findings must be 
upheld unless contrary to the clear weight of the evidence. 
However, its legal conclusion of reliability and, therefore, 
admissibility is reviewed for correctness. Here, the trial 
court's factual findings: 
(1) that the victim had the physical and 
mental capacity to accurately observe the 
events, and 
(2) that the subsequent identification of 
defendant was not a product of suggestion 
are contrary to the clear weight of the evidence. Because these 
two factors are integral to the determination of reliability, 
there are insufficient facts to support the trial court's 
conclusion of admissibility. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FACTUAL FINDINGS THAT (1) 
THE VICTIM HAD THE CAPACITY TO OBSERVE HIS 
ASSAILANT AND (2) THE VICTIM'S IDENTIFICATION 
OF DEFENDANT WAS NOT A PRODUCT OF SUGGESTION, 
ARE AGAINST THE CLEAR WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. 
BECAUSE THE ERRONEOUS FACTUAL FINDINGS ARE 
INTEGRAL TO THE IDENTIFICATION, THERE ARE 
INSUFFICIENT FACTS TO SUPPORT THE LEGAL 
CONCLUSION THAT THE IDENTIFICATION WAS 
RELIABLE. 
Due process requires a trial court to determine the 
reliability of eyewitness identification evidence prior to 
allowing its admission at trial, Neil v. Biqqers, 409 U.S. 188, 
198-99, 93 S. Ct. 375, 381-82 (1972) (federal due process 
requires that only reliable identifications are admitted into 
evidence); State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 780 (Utah 1991) (state 
due process mandates an analytical "in-depth appraisal of the 
identification's reliability" prior to its admission); State v. 
Long, 721 P.2d 483, 490 (Utah 1986) (setting out the empirical 
factors necessary to a state constitutional assessment of 
identification evidence). 
Defendant properly preserved a challenge to the 
eyewitness identification of defendant by the victim, Leslie 
Norwood, on both state and federal constitutional grounds (R.53-
61). While defendant attacks several aspects of the 
identification, his primary arguments are: (1) that due to 
intoxication, the victim lacked the capacity to reliably observe 
and recall his assailant; and (2) that the circumstances 
surrounding the victim's subsequent identification of defendant 
were suggestive. The State agrees that the trial court's 
5 
findings concerning these two factors are against the clear 
weight of the evidence.1 
Since the state constitutional standard is more 
stringent than the federal, only the state constitutional 
analysis will be addressed. For even if the federal standard 
were met, failure to meet state constitutional requirements would 
still mandate reversal. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 784. To comply 
with state due process, a trial court must determine the 
reliability of the eyewitness identification by making a detailed 
assessment of the totality of facts surrounding the criminal 
episode as well as the identification. Ld. at 781. This 
includes consideration of: 
"(1) the opportunity of the witness to view the actor 
during the event; 
(2) the witness's degree of attention to the actor at 
the time of the event; 
(3) the witness's capacity to observe the event, 
including his or her physical and mental acuity; 
(4) whether the witness's identification was made 
spontaneously and remained consistent thereafter, or 
whether it was the product of suggestion; and, 
(5) the nature of the event being observed and the 
likelihood that the witness would perceive, remember 
and relate it correctly." 
Id. (quoting Long, 721 P.2d at 493). 
To properly assess any errors, the trial court's 
factual findings concerning each Ramirez factor will be examined 
1
 The trial court orally announced its findings and conclusion 
during the evidentiary hearing (R. 326-33). No written findings 
were entered (R. 78). A copy of the oral ruling is attached as an 
addendum of this brief. 
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in light of the record facts. In doing so, the evidence must be 
viewed as a whole and "in the light most favorable to the trial 
court's decision" of reliability- Id. at 781-82. Only when a 
factual finding conflicts with the clear weight of the evidence 
is it erroneous. JEd. at 782. Whether the facts, when so viewed, 
are "sufficient to demonstrate reliability is a question of law," 
which is reviewed for correctness. Id. 
A. The Trial Court's Analysis of the 
Opportunity of the Victim to View the Actor 
The first factor in determining the reliability of 
eyewitness identification is the opportunity of the witness to 
view the actor during the event, including consideration of the 
length of period of observation, the distance between the witness 
and actor, the lighting conditions, whether the witness had ever 
seen the actor in the past, whether the witness saw the actor's 
face, and whether the actor's features were visible or disguised. 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 782; Long, 721 P.2d at 494. 
The trial court stated that it was considering two 
events: (1) the time when Mr. Norwood claimed to have met 
defendant at the transient camp; and (2) the time of the stabbing 
(R. 327). As to the first, the court found that the night before 
the stabbing, Mr. Norwood had been drinking (R. 327). Mr. 
Norwood was sleepy when defendant came to the camp and briefly 
met him (R. 327). These findings are supported by the record (R. 
199-204, 211-17). Turning to the stabbing, the court found that 
Mr. Norwood's assailant was only eight inches away from him when 
the assault occurred (R. 328). This finding is supported by the 
7 
record (R. 205). Additionally, it is undisputed that the assault 
took place in the daytime and was brief (R. 204-05). 
The court then stated: 
. . . [Mr. Norwood] says the words, the fact 
that — to the effect, "Damn, Chico, you 
stabbed me." He knew his name. He 
remembered his name. 
Now, he also reiterated this same 
statement at the hospital, Chico stabbed me. 
He must have remembered something from the 
night before when he met the individual. 
(R. 328). While it is uncontroverted that Norwood made these 
statements (R. 134-37, 150, 205, 240-42), the court improperly 
considered this as demonstrative of the witness's opportunity to 
observe. However, a witness's level of certainty, while a 
legitimate factor under the federal constitutional standard, is 
not to be considered in a state constitutional analysis. 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781. The fact that the victim called his 
assailant "Chico" during the encounter and continued to believe 
that "Chico" was his assailant does not validate the 
identification of defendant to any greater degree than any 
victim's belief that he recognizes the actor as someone he 
previously knew. To accept the victim's certainty that it was 
"Chico" who stabbed him is to beg the question of whether that 
belief is reliable. Accord Long, 721 P.2d at 490 ("Research has 
also undermined the common notion that the confidence with which 
an individual makes an identification is a valid indicator of the 
accuracy of the recollection."). But, the consistency of the 
victim's statements is relevant under the fourth Ramirez factor, 
whether the identification was suggestive or a product of the 
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witness's own memory. 
B. The Trial Court's Analysis of the 
Witness's Degree of Attention to the Actor at 
the Time of the Event 
The second factor in assessing reliability calls for 
the trial court to determine the witness's degree of attention to 
the actor at the time of the event, including whether there were 
any distracting noises or activities during the observation. 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 782-83; Long, 721 P.2d at 494. The trial 
court viewed this factor as also encompassing the issue of 
whether the witness viewed the event as significant (R. 328-29). 
While this is consistent with Long, under Ramirez it is 
considered as the separate fifth factor. Compare Long, 721 P.2d 
at n.8, with Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781. In relation to these 
facts, the distinction is not critical. 
The trial court found that the victim had paid close 
attention during the stabbing (R. 328-29). The evidence supports 
this finding. Contrary to defendant's assertions that Mr. 
Norwood never saw his assailant's face (Br. of Appellant at 4, 
10, 14, 21), Mr. Norwood testified that he did not see who hit 
him but did fully observe the face of the person who stabbed him 
(R. 199, 205, 209, 240). At the time, they were face to face and 
only eight inches apart (R. 205, 209). Additionally, the court's 
finding that the stabbing was a significant event creating a 
greater degree of attentiveness on the part of the victim was 
proper. Long, 721 P.2d at 489. 
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C. The Trial Court's Analysis of the 
Witness's Capacity to Observe the Event 
While the trial court's analysis of the first two 
Ramirez factors is factually supportable, its finding that Mr. 
Norwood had the physical and mental capacity to reliably observe 
his assailant is contrary to the clear weight of the evidence and 
is, therefore, clearly erroneous. 
Ramirez mandates that in evaluating a witness's 
physical and mental acuity, the trial court must consider any 
impairments due to stress, fright, fatigue, injury, drugs, 
alcohol, uncorrected visual defects, personal motivations, biases 
or prejudices. JEd. at 783; Long, 721 P.2d at 488, 494. Here, 
the trial court entered a finding concerning only one fact, Mr. 
Norwood's intoxication. The court stated: 
There was no question he was drunk. I was 
not persuaded he had taken any drugs. 
There's no question there were track marks on 
his arm, but there's been a reasonable 
explanation given. There was no evidence — 
he said he didn't take drugs. There's no 
evidence that he did take drugs. I am not 
persuaded that he did. I am persuaded he did 
drink a lot and was intoxicated at the time. 
I am persuaded that he had a high tolerance 
for drinking, that he drank continually, that 
it was his normal way of life, so to speak, 
and even the expert said that a percentage of 
the Indian race has a higher tolerance 
although he couldn't say that a person of the 
Cherokee race — specifically of the Navajo. 
(R. 329). 
The evidence of the victim's intoxication and its 
impact on his capacity to observe were only challenged by Mr. 
Norwood's claim that he had not been drinking the morning of the 
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stabbing (R. 220). The evidence established that Mr. Norwood was 
a chronic alcoholic (R, 182, 184). On the night he met defendant 
at the transient camp, he had been drinking vodka and beer (R. 
203, 213). He was tired (R. 216). Expert testimony established 
that when a person has been drinking, his ability to accurately 
recall an event is substantially diminished (R. 185, 273). 
Accord Long, 721 P.2d 488-90 (discussing similar empirical data 
concerning numerous factors which may diminish a person's ability 
to accurately remember and recall). Studies have established 
that as little as an hour later, the imbiber's memory of what he 
observed while drinking is affected (R.196-97). Here, the expert 
testified that the fact that Mr. Norwood was drinking at the time 
he met defendant would affect his ability to accurately identify 
defendant the next day (R. 196-96, 275). 
Immediately following the stabbing, the victim was 
taken to the hospital. The attending doctor found Mr. Norwood 
to be "stuporous," meaning that he was closer to "comatose or 
nearly dead" than lucid (R. 173, 178-79). The doctor opined that 
this was the result of intoxication rather than his injuries (R. 
174, 179). Chemical analysis established Mr. Norwood's blood 
alcohol level at .364 percent, four times the legal limit (R. 
173). Relatively the same level was present at the time of the 
stabbing (R. 181). Mr. Norwood was unaware of his surroundings 
and non-responsive except to pain (R. 173-74). 
A toxicology expert testified that a .364 percent blood 
alcohol level would severely inhibit a person's capacity to 
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accurately observe or recall events (R. 185-86)• The expert 
testified: 
[N]o individual could sustain that blood 
alcohol concentration unless they were an 
individual who drank excessively for many, 
many years on a routine daily basis or if in 
fact they were a diagnosed alcoholic of some 
considerable years* Only even then would an 
individual in my experience be able to stand 
upright, if you will, be able to tolerate 
physically that amount of alcohol. 
(R. 184). But, such chronic alcoholics would still 
suffer very severe impairments in their 
mental abilities and other of their 
faculties, whether or not they showed 
physical disabilities. 
(R. 185). The court's finding that this level of intoxication 
would not affect Mr. Norwood's mental processes to the same 
degree as a non-alcoholic is clearly contrary to the weight of 
the evidence. 
The related finding that Mr. Norwood's half-Cherokee 
status insulated him from full impairment of his mental processes 
is also contrary to the evidence. The toxicologist testified 
that studies have demonstrated that some Southwestern Native 
Americans, such as the Navajos, can tolerate more alcohol than 
Caucasians in the sense that at the point when a Caucasian 
drinker would be in a coma, a Navajo drinker may still be able to 
walk (R. 191). When asked if the same was true of Cherokees, the 
toxicologist stated that he did not know (R. 192). Again, as in 
the case of chronic alcoholics, the toxicologist explained that 
even though the observable physical impairments might differ, the 
ability to accurately process information remained equally 
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affected (R. 185, 191-94). 
The court additionally failed to consider the effects 
of stress, fright, fatigue and injury. Mr. Norwood admitted that 
he was physically ailing prior to the stabbing. While denying 
that he had been drinking on the morning of the stabbing, Mr. 
Norwood testified that he was hung-over (R. 220). He had a 
headache, felt weak and had dry heaves (R. 222-23). He was 
surprised when he was "jumped" (R. 242). The hit prior to the 
stabbing left him "dazed" and "fading" (R. 241-42). An expert 
testified that the effects of the hang-over together with the 
stress and injury of being hit would all affect the victim's 
capacity to accurately observe (R. 269-274). 
Both experts agreed that, under these circumstances, it 
would be extremely unlikely that Mr. Norwood could make a 
reliable identification of his assailant (R. 189, 196, 283-84). 
While the court was not obligated to accept the experts' opinions 
of incapacity, the court did subsequently state that the 
testimony was "very strong," and "good [and] reliable" (R. 333). 
It was also uncontradicted. As such, the only factual finding 
supportable by the evidence was that Mr. Norwood's capacity to 
observe during the stabbing was substantially impaired. See 
State v. Cummins, No. 900419-CA, slip op. at 16 n.25 (Utah App. 
August 25, 1992) (noting the severe effects of a blood alcohol 
level exceeding .30 percent). 
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D. The Trial Court's Analysis of 
Suggestibility in the Identification Process 
The fourth Ramirez factor involves a consideration of 
any suggestibility in the identification process. It entails 
inquiries into whether the witness's identification was 
spontaneous and remained consistent; including considerations of 
the length of time between the original observation and the 
identification; the witness's mental capacity and state of mind 
at the time of the identification; the witness's exposure to 
opinions and descriptions of others, including photographs, 
newspaper accounts and other information or influences that may 
have affected the independence of his identification; any 
instances when the witness failed to identify the defendant; any 
instances when the witness gave a description of the actor 
inconsistent with the defendant's appearance; and the 
circumstances under which the defendant was presented to the 
witness for identification, Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 783-84; Long, 
721 P.2d at 494-95 n.8. 
The trial court found that the victim consistently 
insisted that the person who stabbed him was the person he had 
met at the transient camp (R.329-30). The court found that the 
physical descriptions of the assailant given by the victim "did 
not differ that much from the two times that it was given" and 
was not "that far off" from defendant's appearance (R. 330-31). 
The court found that while months had elapsed between the 
incident and identifications, the victim had actually made an 
immediate identification during the crime by calling out, "Chico, 
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why are you doing this to me?" (R. 330). 
Additionally, the court found that when the victim had 
the opportunity to observe defendant in the preliminary hearing 
courtroom, he immediately identified him (R. 332). The court 
found that prior to the courtroom identification, Detective 
Howell told the victim, "[W]e have arrested the person that 
assaulted you" (R. 332). The victim then went into the 
courtroom, observed defendant in jail garb, and told a companion 
that defendant was the one who stabbed him (R. 332). Because the 
victim had previously observed defendant in the courtroom, the 
trial court stated that the subsequent lineup identification was 
not "significant" (R. 332). 
The record established the following facts. The victim 
was first interviewed by Detective Mendez at the hospital 
approximately a week after the stabbing (R. 248-49). Detective 
Mendez, Dr. Schaeffer, and Mr. Norwood testified that he was 
lucid and coherent at the time of the interview (R. 177, 207, 
262). Mr. Norwood identified his assailant as "Chico" whom he 
had met the first day he was in Salt Lake, which would have been 
several days before the stabbing (R. 255, 263-64). He described 
"Chico" as a male "Mexican" with a heavy accent, 160-170 pounds 
in weight, with short dark hair (R. 251-52). Mr. Norwood stated 
that he was 5'10" tall and "Chico" was slightly shorter, about 
5'8" or 5'9" (R. 207, 235). Detective Mendez did not recall 
asking if "Chico" had any tatoos but remembered Mr. Norwood 
stating that he did not (R. 253). 
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About four days later, Detective Howell interviewed Mr. 
Norwood (R. 134). This time, Mr. Norwood described "Chico" as 
being about 5'5" in height, 130-140 pounds, hispanic, with dark 
hair and mustache, and about 30 years old (R. 147-49). He 
maintained that he had met "Chico" at the camp but said it was 
the night before the stabbing (R. 134-35, 137, 167). 
When Mr. Norwood testified, he did not offer an 
explanation for the differences in the descriptions given to 
Detectives Mendez and Howell. He did testify that during the 
stabbing he had "a good look" at "Chico's" right hand and did not 
observe any tatoos (R. 245). 
The arresting officer described defendant as "extremely 
short" and "heavy set" (R. 257). Defendant is 5'2" in height and 
weighs 150 pounds (R. 244, 258). He is Hispanic but has only a 
slight accent which is difficult to discern if only a few words 
are spoken (R. 247A). Both his hands are tattooed. The right 
hand has a two-inch by one-inch cross, another half-inch cross, 
and a one-half inch wide line going up and around his wrist; the 
left hand has an inch by half-inch black star and a two and one-
half inch by one-half inch solid ribbon (R. 120-21). Defendant 
testified that in December, 1990, he had dark shoulder length 
hair and a one-inch beard; the arresting officer testified that 
defendant did not have a beard when arrested and may have had 
short hair, but he was unsure (R. 119, 257-58).2 
2
 A photograph of defendant was admitted into evidence 
(Exhibit 3). This photograph was taken in March, 1991, at the time 
of the lineup (R. 118). 
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The court's finding that the physical descriptions 
given by the victim were consistent and reasonably matched that 
of defendant is not completely supported by the record. However, 
during the evidentiary hearing, the parties had Mr. Norwood and 
defendant stand side-by-side (R. 244). The court then made its 
own observations of their relative size and the descriptions 
given: 
Now, the two individuals stood before the 
court and it was indicated that Mr. Ramirez 
said he was 5'2" and — Mr. Norwood said he 
was 5'10". . . . Yes, he is shorter than 
him. Looking at the individual, whether he 
is 5'2" to 5'5" in that area, is pretty 
difficult. 
(R. 331). The trial court was in a unique position to observe 
first-hand defendant's physical characteristics and compare them 
to the witness's description. See Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 784 
(recognizing the trial court's unique ability to appraise 
demeanor and credibility evidence). For this reason, the court's 
finding that the physical descriptions did not "differ that much" 
and were "reasonable" should be given deference. 
Turning to the issue of suggestibility in the 
preliminary hearing courtroom encounter between defendant and the 
victim, the circumstances surrounding the incident were 
essentially undisputed. Detective Howell testified that he 
brought Mr. Norwood to the courtroom pursuant to a subpoena in 
this case and not specifically to make an identification (R. 140-
42). Before entering the courtroom, the detective told Mr. 
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Norwood, "[W]e have arrested the person who stabbed you" (R. 
157), or M"[W]e have a person in custody by the name of Chico" 
(R. 162). Mr. Norwood then entered the courtroom and observed 
only defendant being brought in handcuffed and in jail garb (R. 
238-39). Mr. Norwood turned to his companion and said, "That's 
the one that stabbed me coming through the door" (R. 209). He 
did not relate this information to the police until the March 
lineup (R. 209-10, 239). 
The test for determining if a pretrial identification 
is sufficiently suggestive as to violate due process is whether 
the circumstances surrounding the identification were "so 
impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial 
likelihood of irreparable misidentification." State v. Thamer, 
777 P.2d 432, 435 (Utah 1989) (citing Simmons v. United States, 
390 U.S. 377, 383, 88 S. Ct. 967, 970 (1968)). If the pretrial 
identification is found to be suggestive, any subsequent 
identification "must be based on an untainted, independent 
foundation to be reliable." jxl. (citing Manson v. Brathwaite, 
432 U.S. 98, 114, 97 S. Ct. 2243, 2253 (1977)). 
Dr. Dodd, a psychologist and eyewitness expert, 
testified that the in-court identification was suggestive for 
several reasons: (1) it was a one-on-one situation; (2) the 
victim had been told that his assailant was in custody; (3) 
defendant was presented in jail garb and custody; and (4) 
defendant was presented as the person who the State had already 
determined should be prosecuted (R. 278-79). The Utah appellate 
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courts have expressed similar concerns. See Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 
784 (explaining the suggestiveness in procedures focusing on a 
single, in-custody defendant); Thamer, 777 P.2d at 435 (noting 
that any identification procedure should not emphasize one person 
over another and warning against subtle police influences); Long, 
721 P.2d at 490 (discussing the subtle distortions which may 
occur in the retention or recall stage of identification). 
The trial court implicitly found the courtroom 
encounter not to be suggestive (R. 331-33). The court appears to 
have ruled that any problem with the pre-encounter statement of 
Detective Howell's that the police had arrested Mr. Norwood's 
assailant was overcome by Mr. Norwood's "immediate" 
identification of defendant when he was brought into the 
courtroom (R. 332). As it did in ruling on the victim's capacity 
to observe, the trial court accepted as credible the expert's 
opinion that the encounter was suggestive but gave it little 
weight (R. 333). The court concluded that this case did not have 
features of the "more questionable" show-up identification in 
Ramirez (R. 333). 
The trial court's finding that Mr. Norwood's 
identification of defendant was a product of his own memory is 
contrary to the weight of the evidence. As the court noted, this 
factor carries great weight in determining the reliability of an 
identification (R. 332). See Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 784. Here, 
defendant had been drinking when he first observed "Chico," and 
was drunk when assaulted. Almost two months later, while he is 
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being transported to court to testify in the assault case, he is 
told that the police have arrested his assailant. He then enters 
the courtroom and the only male in custody is defendant. The 
court's emphasis on the fact that an identification was 
immediately made begs the question of whether it was the product 
of suggestion.3 
E. The Trial Court's Analysis of the Nature 
of the Event Observed 
The final factor for the trial court to consider is the 
nature of the event observed and the likelihood that the witness 
would perceive, remember and relate it correctly, including 
whether the event was an ordinary one in the mind of the observer 
during the time it was observed and whether the race of the actor 
was the same as the observer's. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781 
(quoting Long, 721 P.2d at 493). 
The court here considered one aspect. The court found 
that since the stabbing was so significant an event, the victim 
"would remember [his assailant] more as a result of this 
particular event" (R. 333). As discussed above (supra at 11), 
this was proper. 
3
 Defendant also raises the issue of whether his sixth 
amendment right to counsel was violated in the preliminary hearing 
courtroom encounter (Br. of Appellant at 19 n.3). Defendant's 
failure to timely raise this issue below renders it waived for 
purposes of appeal. State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922 (Utah 
App. 1991). See also State v. Mincv, 192 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 20 
(Utah App. July 22, 1992) (holding that no right to counsel exists 
at a show-up). 
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F. The Trial Court's Conclusion of 
Reliability and Admissibility 
In concluding that the identification of defendant was 
admissible, the trial court ruled that it could not fully accept 
the "strong" and "good reliable testimony" of the two expert 
witnesses that Mr. Norwood's capacity to make a reliable 
identification was substantially impaired and that the in-court 
identification was a product of suggestion because those 
circumstances "would not do away with the fact that he had met 
this individual . • . [and] remembered his name the next morning 
— he said Chico" (R. 333). This conclusion improperly 
considered the certainty of the witness's identification* and 
failed to consider the significant weight of the victim's lack of 
capacity to accurately observe together with suggestibility in 
the identification process. Even when the facts are viewed in 
the light most favorable to the trial court's decision, they 
remain insufficient as a matter of law to warrant a preliminary 
finding of reliability and, therefore, admissibility. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the court's erroneous conclusion that the 
eyewitness identification was admissible, the trial court's 
denial of defendant's motion to suppress should be reversed and 
A
 Under the state constitutional standard, the certainty of 
the witness in making an identification cannot be considered. See 
discussion, supra at 10. 
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the case remanded for proceedings consistent with that ruling. 
DATED this /cWday of September, 1992. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney Gene; 
CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of 
the foregoing brief of appellee was mailed, postage prepaid, to 
Joan C. Watt, Elizabeth A. Bowman and Vernice S. Ah Ching, 
attorneys for appellant, Salt Lake Legal Defender Association, 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this 





should be given to the jury. 
THE COURT: Let me indicate that counsel and the 
defendant have submitted four cases to the court, two of 
which the court was quite familiar with, prior to taking 
the bench, and that I have read before in other cases and 
which I have reviewed over the evening. In fact, I read 
the Ramirez case Tuesday before taking the bench and 
participating in this case. The court did read State v. 
Rimmasch and State v. Thamer. I don't think they add that 
much to the matter before the court today. I think the two 
cases that are controlling are State v. Long and State v. 
Ramirez of which I will say I dealt with in other cases and 
did read the Ramirez case before taking the bench 
yesterday, and the court reread it last night, again. Now 
let me state that I think I understand ~ I know I 
understand what the court is saying in State v. Ramirez as 
far as the responsibility of the trial court in its 
determinations as far as the matters of law and to rule on 
those questions and not submit them to the jury. But I am 
not sure that as I hear the argument here today and I apply 
it to this case, that we, again, to talk of facts and law, 
I am not sure that either I am smart enough to distinguish 
them or the argument that I am hearing is not 
distinguishing these facts. I think the court has the 



























very clear, as to what the situation is as far as 
identification. Where it is a factual matter, where 
reasonable minds could differ, I think it is a jury 
question, and I don't think Ramirez goes to the point of 
saying that questions of fact should not be submitted to 
the jury. Of course, maybe that would be determined later 
and I would hope it doesn't say that. 
So I am looking at this case this way. I am 
ruling on it where it is question of fact, I am looking at 
those questions of facts and making my determination and 
feel that where reasonable minds will differ, I would 
submit them to the jury. 
Now, both of you have argued the Ramirez case as 
far as the points of which they bring out. And let me go 
through those with you, the way I am looking at them in 
this particular case that you both use those. 
First of all, number one, the opportunity of the 
witness to view the actor and the event, I look at two 
events here. I look at the meeting of the defendant at the 
fireside or the — at the fire and at the time of the 
stabbing, now, there's no question it was a short time when 
he met him the evening before. And he admitted he had 
been—the victim had been drinking and he was sleepy but he 
did see him. Be did meet him. That's about all right at 




























stabbed — he sees him for eight seconds — no, eight 
inches away from him and there he says the words, the fact 
that — to the effect, "Damn, Chico, you stabbed me." He 
knew his name. He remembered his name. 
Now, he also reiterated this same statement at 
the hospital, Chico stabbed me. He must have remembered 
something from the night before when he met the individual. 
Now, number two, the attention to the gun man, 
and this is somewhat repetitious of the first, but when I 
say attention, I am looking at the Ramirez case—I guess I 
shouldn't say that but the attention given, there was not a 
great deal of attention given of the night before. I think 
when a person is stabbed they begin to give attention. I 
refer you to the case of State v. Long where the court in 
rather extensive discussion goes into an academic 
discussion concerning things that we remember as they take 
place, and he says if you ask a person what they were doing 
when John F. Kennedy was assassinated, they would probably 
remember. But if you ask them the color of the car that 
was in front of them when they stopped at the red light to 
drive to work this morning, they wouldn't remember. Well, 
I don't dispute that. I agree with it, that if I saw an 
individual walking down the street with a knife all 
strapped to his belt, I probably wouldn't remember that 




stabbed me and I knew him, I met him the night before and 
he stabbed me, I would remember him. That is likening to 
the situation when John Kennedy was assassinated. I think 
the event brought out to the victim was such a significant 
event in his life that he looked very close at that and was 
remembering it. 
And, three, the reliability factor, does he have 
the capacity to remember —had the capacity to remember the 
event? There was no question he was drunk. I was not 
persuaded he had taken any drugs. There's no question 
there were track marks on his arm, but there's been a 
reasonable explanation given. There was no evidence—he 
said he didn't take drugs. There's no evidence that he did 
take drugs. I am not persuaded that he did. I am 
persuaded he did drink a lot and was intoxicated at the 
time. I am persuaded that he had a high tolerance for 
drinking, that he drank continually, that it was his normal 
way of life, so to speak, and even the expert said that a 
percentage of the Indian race has a higher tolerance 
although he couldn't say that a person of the Cherokee race 
— specifically of the Navajo. 
Number four, where the identification is made 
spontaneously, made consistent at the time of the stabbing, 
he said, "Damn it, Chico, you stabbed me." Be said, "Chico 
stabbed me," in the hospital. He told the officer, "Chico 
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stabbed me." So it was consistent as far as what he was 
saying. 
Five, identification of how long after 
identification took place, well, as far as the actual 
identifying of the defendant in this case, it took place I 
guess some days, weeks after but as far as the 
indentification of stating who he was, who had stabbed him, 
he identified him immediately. He didn't see him. I guess 
it was either — it was months when he saw him. He 
identified him. It didn't vary from him identifying the 
particular individual who had perpetrated the stabbing. 
Number six, the descriptions, whether they are 
confused or not. Counsel for the defense makes a great 
deal out of the descriptions, and they should and it does 
carry a lot of weight, but as I look at these descriptions 
I am not persuaded the descriptions are that far off. Now, 
my notes stated that he told Officer Howell he was 
approximately 5'5", weight is hundred thirty, hundred 
forty, Hispanic race, dark hair, mustache, no tatoos, 
small, name Chico, couldn't identify him from the photo 
spread, saw a person that looked like him on the photo 
spread. To Officer Mendez, he told him weight; hundred 
sixty, hundred seventy; height, S'S" to 5f9"; hair color, 
dark; hair, short; age, he didn't ask him ~ he said race 



























facial hair, he didn't ask him. Be said he had a Mexican 
accent. He doesn't ask him anything about the clothing. 
So that many things Officer Mendez did not go into, of 
which Officer Howell did go into. 
Now, the two individuals stood before the court 
and it was indicated that Mr. Ramirez said he was 5'2" and 
— M r . Norwood said he was 5'10". The eight inches 
difference, counsel brought out the fact that the boots 
were on. Of course, counsel argued against that. The 
court did see the boots. There's no question that those 
boots were higher from the type of shoe than the type of 
shoe that the defendant had on which could have amounted to 
at least an inch so you have a seven-inch difference. Yes, 
he is shorter than him. Looking at the individual, whether 
he is 5'2" to 5'5" in that area, is pretty difficult. 
I think he said his weight is a hundred sixty and 
his weight the second time he said hundred sixty to hundred 
seventy. First time, he said a hundred fifty to hundred 
sixty — now I take that a hundred thirty to hundred forty. 
First time he said, there's a weight difference somewhat, 
but that is something that is flexible so what I am saying 
is that the description of the individual as far as what 
was asked him did not differ that much from the two times 
that it was given. 




























suggestibility. This does carry great weight I think as 
far as identification is concerned. The only suggestion 
that has been made in this case was when Officer Howell 
took the victim to court and said that, "Well, I will have 
to check my notes exactly what he said, because I believe 
we have arrested the person that assaulted you," something 
to that effect. Officer Howell was not with him, but the 
victim, Mr. Norwood, and his partner went into the 
courtroom, sat down. They brought the defendant in. Yes, 
he was dressed in jail garb and he immediately said to his 
partner, that's the man who stabbed me, his identification 
then became immediate the first time that he had seen him 
since the event. Then he looked at the photo spreads and 
he did not see him in the one and he identified the other 
which I think the photo spreads at that time were probably 
superfluous but I do think it is significant when the first 
time he saw the photo spread he said that this man looks 
like him but it is not him. 
MR. VUYK: I think what we are talking is the 
lineups rather than additional photo spreads. There were 
two lines up. 
THE COURT: I am sorry, yes, that is correct. 
And so as I say, it is not as significant after of course 
he identified him and had seen him in the courtroom, he 





























experts which have been brought to this court give very 
strong testimony and the court is not sitting here to try 
to dispute that testimony, that the testimony is probably 
good reliable testimony, that it is not something that this 
court can accept in every particular case and it's not 
something that would do away with the fact that he had met 
this individual. He remembered his name the next morning 
— he said Chico. He tells the officer, "Chico stabbed 
me." And he was able to of course, also, give a 
description of which this court feels was a reasonable 
description and also able to identify him when he first saw 
him. 
Mow, as I compare this case to the identification 
in State v. Ramirez I think the identification there was 
much more difficult, much more questionable than in this 
case and also, as I say, I am putting some weight on the 
question of the argument that the court — the Supreme 
Court uses in the Kennedy situation. I think that he would 
remember him more as a result of this particular event and 
based on that the court does find that the — denies the 
motion to suppress the evidence as far as the 
identification and will allow this matter to be submitted 
to the jury. Any questions? 
MS. AH CHING: None. 
MR. VUYK: While we are here can we set a trial 
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